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INTRODUCTION 
On March 31, 2016, the State of Georgia executed my client, Joshua 
Bishop.2  Until the time of his execution, several successive legal teams chal-
lenged his conviction and sentence through the usual channels: direct appeal, 
state habeas corpus proceedings, and federal habeas corpus proceedings.  
The last hearing on the merits of his case was before a panel of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,3 which accepts appeals 
from death penalty cases out of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama.  In a lengthy 
opinion describing the many mitigating circumstances present in Mr. 
Bishop’s case, the Eleventh Circuit denied relief.4  This is not uncommon.  
What stood out, however, in the preparation of his petition for certiorari in 
the United States Supreme Court, was certain terminology in the opinion that 
seemed to indicate it had re-weighed evidence offered in aggravation and 
mitigation of his death sentence.  This was disconcerting, since Georgia is a 
“non-weighing” state.5  This error formed the basis for Mr. Bishop’s final 
legal challenge—which was ultimately unsuccessful, but which attracted na-
tional interest.6  This Article describes the heart of that challenge and ex-
plains why the appropriate legal tests matter in such cases: life is at stake. 
 
 1 Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law. J.D., Emory Law School, 2002. 
M.T.S., Candler School of Theology, Emory University, 2002. I would especially like to thank the 
current and former students who have ably served as research assistants on this issue. These include 
Caryn Dreibelbis, Katie Hall, Sara Witherspoon, and Courtney Britt. I would also like to honor the 
work of the students participating through the Mercer Habeas Project in the representation of 
Joshua Bishop. Dianna Lee, a 2014 graduate of Mercer Law School, provided particular leadership 
on the petition for certiorari in his case, and my heartfelt thanks goes to her and to the many others 
who so zealously advocated for our dear client. 
 2 See Rhonda Cook, Georgia Executes Joshua Bishop for 1994 Murder, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION: METRO ATLANTA / STATE NEWS (Mar. 31, 2016, 9:41 PM), 
http://www.ajc.com/news/local/georgia-executes-joshua-bishop-for-1994-mur-
der/cMjL3hrLCd0XaCk9AEUI3K/. 
 3 See Bishop v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification State Prison, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253 (11th 
Cir. 2013). 
 4 Id.  
 5 See infra note 45. 
 6 See Maureen Johnston, Petitions to Watch, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 17, 2014, 1:30 PM), 
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In the summer of 1994, Joshua Bishop was a homeless nineteen-year-
old7 who spent his childhood in foster care, group homes, or on the streets—
manipulated, beaten, and abandoned. Mr. Bishop had always been a “sweet 
kid,” but began staying with Mark Braxley, a former lover of his mother’s.8  
Within weeks, though he had never before been charged with a crime more 
serious than a misdemeanor, Mr. Bishop faced murder charges for the tragic 
results of his connection with Braxley.9 
These circumstances never provided excuse sufficient to establish legal 
innocence of his crimes committed in those summer weeks; in fact, Mr. 
Bishop confessed within hours of his arrest and sought to plead guilty.10  
While the question of Mr. Bishop’s guilt was not a difficult one for his trial 
jury—hearing his confession, it returned a verdict after only a few hours—it 
struggled with whether to deliver a sentence of death.11  
During the sentencing phase, the jury heard from several witnesses about 
Mr. Bishop’s horrific childhood.  The prosecution also played Mr. Bishop’s 
custodial confession to participation in the beating death of Ricky Willis, a 
man who had assaulted Mr. Bishop’s mother.12  When Willis bragged to oth-
ers about the assault, Mr. Bishop became very angry and [] beat . . . Ricky 
Willis.13  Mr. Bishop then told the police that Mark Braxley—who had a 
violent history with Willis—slit Willis’s throat, killing him.14  Mr. Bishop 
admitted he helped Braxley bury the body and his statement to police was 
consistent with the medical examiner’s testimony indicating Willis had died 
from knife injuries and not from the abrasions to his head and face.15  
On February 13, 1996, Mr. Bishop was sentenced to death.16 
_____________ 
Years later, in state habeas proceedings, new counsel raised a number of 
claims related to ineffective assistance of trial counsel.17  Trial counsel testi-
fied to their belief and their trial strategy that Mr. Bishop was truthful in his 
 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/09/petitions-to-watch-the-long-conference-of-september-29-
part-iii/ (identifying Bishop v. Humphries as a “petition to watch”). 
 7 Warden, 726 F.3d at 1250–51. 
 8 Brief of Amici Curiae Public Counsel et al. in Support of Petitioner at 4, Bishop v. Humphrey, 135 
S. Ct. 67 (2014) (mem.) (No. 13–1345), 2014 WL 2612611, at *4.  
 9 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 8, at 4–5; Warden, 726 F.3d at 1249. 
 10 See Bishop v. State, 486 S.E.2d 887, 891 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1997). 
 11 Warden, 726 F.3d at 1252–53 (noting that the jury deliberated for nine hours before recommending 
a sentence of death). 
 12 Id. at 1249. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 1250.  
 16 Id. at 1252–53.  On September 11, 1996, Mark Braxley accepted the State’s offer of a life sentence 
with the possibility of parole and pleaded guilty to the murder of Ricky Willis and Leverett Morri-
son and one count of armed robbery. 
 17 See id.  
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custodial statement, remorseful for his crimes, and less culpable for the 
crimes than his co-defendant, Mark Braxley.  Three law enforcement officers 
who agreed with these general assertions testified by sworn affidavit in Mr. 
Bishop’s habeas proceedings.18 
Trial counsel described the officers’ reluctance to testify at trial,19 but 
explained he never attempted to compel them to tell the jury about their im-
pressions of Mr. Bishop’s truthfulness, remorsefulness, or limited role in the 
crimes.20  The presentation of additional mitigation and context—available, 
but never provided to the sentencing jury—was voluminous, including de-
scriptions of Mr. Bishop as desperate for, and vulnerable to, father figures.21  
Told of this evidence, a number of the sentencing jurors also testified by 
affidavit that they would not have voted for death.22  Nevertheless, Mr. 
Bishop’s state and federal challenges were unsuccessful.23  The language in 
the Eleventh Circuit opinion, discussed infra, claimed that any errors of trial 
counsel were harmless because the new evidence was insufficient to “under-
mine” the evidence presented in aggravation of the sentence.24 
The use and application of that language was troubling. 
When states re-crafted death penalty statutes after Gregg v. Georgia,25 
which allowed jurisdictions to reinstate capital punishment, some—”weigh-
ing states”—promulgated laws allowing juries to impose death sentences 
only after determining that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigat-
ing factors.26  Others—”non-weighing” states—instructed jurors that they 
could return a sentence less than death for any reason or no reason at all, 
even after finding a statutory aggravator.27  It is clear that Strickland v. Wash-
ington establishes the universal test for evaluating ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. 28  The majority of federal appellate courts, however, do not 
appropriately apply the Strickland test for penalty-phase prejudice according 
 
 18 Id. at 1254–55. 
 19 Id. at 1255.   
 20 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 8, at 14–15. 
 21 See Warden, 726 F.3d at 1252. 
 22 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 8, at 16–19. 
 23 Warden, 726 F.3d at 1253, 1259. 
 24 Id. at 1256.  
 25 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186–87 (1976).  
 26 See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 135 n.6 (2006); 
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193, 197. 
 27 The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 135 n.6 (2006). 
 28 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (“A convicted defendant’s claim that 
counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has 
two components.  First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.  This 
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘coun-
sel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must show that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”). 
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to the underlying states’ capital sentencing statutes.  The question explored 
here identifies a split among the federal circuits and has not been addressed 
by the United States Supreme Court. 
This Article argues that it is error, as occurred in Mr. Bishop’s case, for 
a federal appellate court to undertake identical analyses of penalty-phase 
prejudice in capital cases arising from both weighing and non-weighing 
states.  Additionally, the Article discusses how the current analysis of many 
federal circuit courts errs by improperly “weighing” aggravation against mit-
igation evidence rather than applying a prejudice test appropriate to individ-
ual states’ capital sentencing statutes.29  
I. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN CAPITAL CASES 
A. History and Background of the Sixth Amendment Test for Effective 
Assistance of Counsel  
The test for Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 
well-established.30  Since it was decided in 1984, Strickland v. Washington31 
has caused consternation for those representing criminal defendants.32  Su-
preme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall famously (and presciently) warned 
about the failures of that test.33   
 
 29 The first piece to address issues close to the ones discussed in this Article is by Marcia A. Widder, 
Hanging Life in the Balance: The Supreme Court and the Metaphor of Weighing in the Penalty 
Phase of the Capital Trial, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1341, 1343-44 (1994) (“In jurisdictions where the 
sentencer is instructed to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine the appropriate 
penalty, the Court has concluded that aggravating factors guide the sentencer’s discretion and, con-
sequently, reliance on an invalid aggravating factor improperly tilts the sentencing balance in favor 
of death. In weighing jurisdictions, therefore, the Court has prohibited automatic affirmance of 
death sentences that rest in part on invalid aggravating factors. On the other hand, in jurisdictions 
whose statutory schemes do not require the sentencer to weigh the aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors, the Court has determined that the invalidation of one or more aggravating factors is meaning-
less, as long as at least one valid aggravating factor remains to support the defendant’s death pen-
alty.”). 
 30 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390–91 (2000) (“It is past question that the rule set forth in 
Strickland qualifies as ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.’” ) (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)); cf. Bill Cristman, Chandler v. United States: 
Does the Defense Attorney Have a Legal Obligation to Present Mitigation Evidence in Eleventh 
Circuit Death Penalty Cases?, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 564–65 (2001) (noting that the holding 
of an Eleventh Circuit death penalty case “seemingly eviscerates” the Strickland test for ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
 31 Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. 
 32 See John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1972, 1986–88, 1992 (2005); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No 
Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 625, 640–45 (1986).  
 33 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (“The state and lower fed-
eral courts have developed standards for distinguishing effective from inadequate assistance.  To-
day, for the first time, this Court attempts to synthesize and clarify those standards. . . . [I]n its zeal 
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In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court explained that “[t]he pur-
pose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a de-
fendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the 
proceeding.”34  To this end, the Court laid out a two-prong approach to de-
termine whether “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness”35 and whether, in the case of a trial, “there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different.”36 
As “the range of reasonable applications is substantial,”37 “[t]he govern-
ing legal standard plays a critical role in defining the question to be asked in 
assessing the prejudice from counsel’s errors.”38  That is, the question of 
prejudice is necessarily circumscribed by the specific legislation governing 
the imposition of that particular death sentence.39 
Strickland’s general rule was, naturally, applied to the Florida case be-
fore it: a death sentence that had been handed down after a capital jury found 
the aggravating circumstances had outweighed the mitigating circum-
stances.40  The Court assessed the question of prejudice and found that the 
“question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, 
the sentence . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”41 
The Strickland standard is unquestionably the law of the land—the base-
line standard by which courts are to adjudicate Sixth Amendment claims—
 
to survey comprehensively this field of doctrine, the majority makes many other generalizations 
and suggestions that I find unacceptable.  Most importantly, the majority fails to take adequate 
account of the fact that the locus of this case is a capital sentencing proceeding.”) 
 34 Id. at 691–92 (majority opinion). 
 35 Id. at 687–88. 
 36 Id. at 694. 
 37 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). 
 38 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 
 39 See id. (“In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted in the required preju-
dice, a court should presume, absent challenge to the judgment on grounds of evidentiary insuffi-
ciency, that the judge or jury acted according to law. . . . The assessment of prejudice should pro-
ceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially 
applying the standards that govern the decision.”); see also Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 
1243, 1282 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (observing that the district court took into account the death 
penalty statute at issue when deciding that counsel’s ineffectiveness prejudiced the defense), rev’d, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 40 The Court found, in order to show prejudice under the Florida statute, a defendant must prove that 
“there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer—including an appellate 
court, to the extent that it independently reweighs the evidence—would have concluded that the 
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 695. The former Fifth Circuit analyzed the facts under the contemporary state death penalty 
statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West, Westlaw through 2017 First Reg. Sess. and Spec. “A” 
Sess. of the 25th Legis.). See Washington, 693 F.2d at 1247 (describing the factual and procedural 
history of the conviction).  
 41 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 
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but courts should consider those claims in consultation with the relevant state 
death penalty statute.  “The governing legal standard plays a critical role in 
defining the question to be asked in assessing the prejudice from counsel’s 
errors.”42 
This Court further explained that “[t]he assessment of prejudice should 
proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscien-
tiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision.”43  
Weighing the mitigating and aggravating circumstances is required under the 
capital sentencing statute relevant to Strickland.44  The standard that governs 
a Georgia capital jury’s decision, on the other hand, does not require a weigh-
ing analysis or deliberation.45  The United States Supreme Court has repeat-
edly affirmed the legitimacy of Georgia’s unique capital sentencing 
scheme.46  
Literature reviewing the provision of counsel for criminal defendants has 
identified problems on a number of levels and for a number of reasons.47  
One piece notably claimed that “[w]hile in theory the Sixth Amendment re-
quires that counsel be minimally effective,” that was not the practical result: 
To avoid overturning convictions in droves, the Supreme Court has watered 
down the definition of effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment, so any “lawyer with a pulse will be deemed effective.”  As too 
 
 42 Id. (emphasis added).  
 43 Id. 
 44 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2017) (requiring both jury and judge to determine “[w]hether 
aggravating factors exist which outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist”).  
 45 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (2017) (requiring the court to find at least one aggravating circum-
stance to impose the death sentence but not to conduct any weighing); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 
862, 864, 873–75, 888–91 (1983) (footnote omitted) (“In Georgia, unlike some other States, the 
jury is not instructed to give any special weight to any aggravating circumstance, to consider mul-
tiple aggravating circumstances any more significant than a single such circumstance, or to balance 
aggravating against mitigating circumstances pursuant to any special standard.”). 
 46 See Id. at 879 (“The Georgia scheme provides for categorical narrowing at the definition stage, and 
for individualized determination and appellate review at the selection stage.  We therefore remain 
convinced, as we were in 1976, that the structure of the statute is constitutional.”); Godfrey v. Ga., 
446 U.S. 420 (1980) (reversing one application of Georgia’s death penalty statute but impliedly 
reaffirming the statute’s constitutionality); Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 454 (2005) (recognizing 
that the Godfrey Court had not taken issue with Georgia’s death penalty statute, only with the 
Georgia Supreme Court’s construction of the statute in one particular case). 
 47 See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for 
the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835, 1837 (1994) (outlining “the pervasiveness of deficient 
representation” in death penalty cases); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of “Counsel” 
in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV 433, 433-36 (1993) (“This Article argues for a narrower 
definition of ‘counsel’ that encompasses only those licensed attorneys with the requisite skill and 
knowledge to wage an adequate criminal defense.”); Debra Cassens Weiss, Kagan Says Poor De-
fendants Are Entitled to a “Ford Taurus” Defense, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.abajour-
nal.com/news/article/kagan_says_poor_defendants_are_entitled_to_a_ford_taurus_defense/ 
(highlighting Justice Elena Kagan’s acknowledgement that “there’s a lot we still need to do” to 
improve legal assistance provided to poor criminal defendants and recalling Justice Kagan’s state-
ment that criminal defendants “deserve at least . . . a lawyer who has the skills, resources and com-
petence needed to thoroughly advise a client . . . .”). 
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many cases chase too few lawyers with too little funding, the inevitable re-
sult is chronic ineffectiveness.48  
The provision of zealous counsel in capital and other criminal cases is an 
important topic, but not the primary focus of this Article. Under examination 
here is whether and how federal circuits—as evidenced by the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s treatment of Mr. Bishop’s case—inconsistently apply the Strickland 
penalty-phase test for prejudice.49 
 B. How Capital Sentencing Structures Make a Difference in the Strickland 
Analysis 
Responding to the U.S. Supreme Court’s warning in Furman v. Georgia 
“to see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spot-
tily to unpopular groups,” states promulgated statutes specifying the factors 
to be considered and the procedures to be followed in deciding when to im-
pose a capital sentence.50  Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court spec-
ified that “[w]hile the jury is permitted to consider any aggravating or miti-
gating circumstances, it must find and identify at least one statutory 
aggravating factor before it may impose a penalty of death.”51  Thus, in the 
wake of Furman and Gregg, death penalty states52 developed statutory 
schemes that generally fall into one of two categories: “weighing”53 and 
 
 48 Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to Lawyers, 70 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1287, 1288 (2013) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1751, 1786 (1999).  
 49 This Article represents thorough research into each federal circuit and its analysis of state capital 
convictions involving Strickland.  This involved review of penalty phase prejudice analysis in hun-
dreds of cases.  The focus below is on some of the most illustrative cases and circuits. 
 50 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 51 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976). See also Katie Morgan & Michael J. Zydney Mann-
heimer, The Impact of Information Overload on the Capital Jury’s Ability to Assess Aggravating 
and Mitigating Factors, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1089, 1094 (2009) (“Aggravating factors 
serve two purposes. First, the presence of an aggravating factor renders the defendant eligible to be 
sentenced to death. Second, aggravating factors are then compared by the jury to any mitigating 
factors in selecting the defendant’s sentence. Recent years have seen an increased amount of ag-
gravating evidence at both the eligibility and selection stages.”). 
 52 As of this publishing, the following states do not have the death penalty: Alaska, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wis-
consin.  States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited August 31, 2017).  The 
District of Columbia does not employ capital punishment either.  Id. 
 53 These include Alabama, ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e) (2017); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-
603(a)–(b) (West 1987); California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1978); see also Brown v. 
Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 221–23 (2006) (describing the way a jury should consider aggravating fac-
tors and invalidated factors under California’s death penalty statute); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West 2015); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3), (e)(1) (West 
2013), invalidated by Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 
(West 2017); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(3), (7) (West 2006); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 35-50-2-9(a), (d) (West 2016); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6617(c), (e) (West 2014); 
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“non-weighing.”54  The majority of states are “weighing,” in which juries 
must find that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating factors in or-
der for the defendant to be sentenced to death.55  However, non-weighing 
states allow juries to consider aggravating and mitigating factors and the jury 
 
Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 68 (West 1982), invalidated by Commonwealth 
v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984); Mississippi, MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-101(2), (3) 
(West 2013); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2522 (West 2011); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 200.030(4)(a) (West 2013); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (2017); North 
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2000(b) (West 2012); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2929.04 (West 2016); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1987); Pennsylvania, 
42 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c) (West 1999); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
13-204(c), (e) (West 2014); and Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(5)(a)–(b) (West 2016). 
 54 These include Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (West 2017); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 532.025(1) (West 2012); Louisiana, LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (1988); Missouri, 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032 (West 2017); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.150 (West 2005); 
South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2010); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-
27A-1 (1995); Texas, TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (West 2013); Virginia, VA. CODE 
ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (West 1977); and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (West 
2015).  
 Some states are difficult to categorize or are considered “hybrid” states vis-à-vis whether capital jurors 
are instructed to weigh mitigating and aggravating evidence when determining sentencing. These 
include Arizona, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752(G) (2012) (“At the penalty phase, the de-
fendant and the state may present any evidence that is relevant to the determination of whether 
there is mitigation that is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. . . . [T]he state may present 
any evidence that demonstrates that the defendant should not be shown leniency including any 
evidence regarding the defendant’s character, propensities, criminal record or other acts.”); Colo-
rado, see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201 (West 2014) (providing that “the jury shall delib-
erate . . . [w]hether at least one aggravating factor has been proved . . . sufficient mitigating factors 
exist which outweigh any aggravating factor or factors found to exist; and . . . whether the defend-
ant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment” but stipulating that a unanimous jury must 
find both an aggravating factor and “insufficient mitigating factors to outweigh” it); see also People 
v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 791 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (“We are persuaded . . . that the statute 
must be interpreted to require that in order to support the imposition of the death penalty, each juror 
must be convinced that the mitigating factors, if any, do not weigh more heavily in the balance than 
the proven statutory aggravating factors.”); Illinois, see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(g) (West 
2015) (“If the jury determines unanimously, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitiga-
tion, that death is the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.”); Mon-
tana, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (West 2003) (mandating that mitigating factors must be 
“sufficiently substantial to call for leniency” in order for a death sentence not to be imposed); Wy-
oming, see WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (West 2001) (providing that the jury deliberate whether 
aggravating and mitigating factors exist, and that “[t]he mere number of aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances found shall have no independent significance”). 
 55 Cody G. Winchester, Weighing Death: Is Death Penalty Eligibility “Especially Heinous, Cruel or 
Depraved?” 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 523 (2016) (“Weighing-state statutes also vary widely in the 
number of statutory mitigators that sentencers consider, and some do not have any mitigators at all 
. . . . [Legislative] silence indicates the legislature’s intent for the sentencing body to adopt the 
broadest view possible to determine what amount of leniency is appropriate.  This [] is important 
because, although the number of statutory mitigators is consistently lower than the number of ag-
gravators, the statute is actually more expansive.  Such breadth is desirable because it gives defense 
attorneys the ability to present anything that could call for leniency, reducing the chance a defend-
ant will be sentenced to death.  Ultimately, it helps ensure that those who do not deserve to receive 
the death penalty are given lengthy prison sentences instead.”).  
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may return a verdict for life for any reason or no reason at all.56 
While Strickland provides a clear penalty-phase test for prejudice, the 
federal courts’ application of Strickland has resulted in uneven and illogical 
results given their inconsistent application of the underlying states’ statutory 
schemes.57  
Several federal circuits—the Fourth58, Fifth59, and Eleventh60 Circuit 
Courts of Appeals—routinely analyze penalty-phase prejudice without ex-
plicit regard to whether the sentence emerges from a weighing or non-weigh-
ing capital sentencing scheme.61  
Other federal circuits, however, properly account for the state-specific 
weighing/non-weighing instructions underlying a capital conviction.62  The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals provides a model worth consideration.  It 
tailors its prejudice analysis to the relevant state’s statutory scheme to “eval-
uate whether the difference between what was presented and what could 
have been presented is sufficient to ‘undermine confidence in the outcome’ 
 
 56 Nicholas A. Fromherz, Note, Assuming Too Much: An Analysis of Brown v. Sanders, 43 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 401, 404–05 & n.17 (2006) (explaining that in “non-weighing” states, “the jury 
weigh[s] any and all mitigating factors against a set of aggravating factors that may or may not 
include the factors making the defendant eligible for death, but which, in the event that such aggra-
vating factors do include the eligibility factors, are not limited to them,” and that “[i]n both weigh-
ing and non-weighing states, the sentencer engages in a weighing process, balancing mitigating 
factors against aggravating factors to determine whether death is warranted. . . . [T]he distinction 
lies not in whether weighing occurs, but in what is weighed”).  
 57 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  See generally Srikanth Srinivasan, Capital 
Sentencing Doctrine and the Weighing-Nonweighing Distinction, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1347 (1995) 
(analyzing the impact of applying either a weighing or a non-weighing statute on the outcome of a 
case). 
 58 Lovitt v. True, 403 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2005); Tucker v. Ozmint, 350 F.3d 433, 442–43 (4th 
Cir. 2003); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 691 (4th Cir. 2001); Hunt v. Lee, 291 F.3d 284, 292 (4th 
Cir. 2002). 
 59 Garza v. Stephens, 738 F.3d 669, 680–81 (5th Cir. 2013); Wood v. Quarterman, 491 F.3d 196, 
202–03 (5th Cir. 2007); Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 519–20 (5th Cir. 1996); Motley v. Collins, 
18 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 60 Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 534 (11th Cir. 2000); Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 
1556–59 (11th Cir. 1994); Cummings v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1356–60, 1365–
66 (11th Cir. 2009); Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1313–14 (11th Cir.2008). 
 61 See Winchester, supra note 55, at 523 (“Weighing-state statutes also vary widely in the number of 
statutory mitigators that sentencers consider, and some do not have any mitigators at all. . . . Even 
though a few states have zero statutory mitigators, each either leaves the definition of a mitigating 
factor open to include any other factors that call for leniency raised by the evidence, or they simply 
describe the weighing function without reference to statutory mitigators . . . . This caveat is im-
portant because, although the number of statutory mitigators is consistently lower than the number 
of aggravators, the statute is actually more expansive.”). 
 62 Research revealed no federal appellate analysis of Strickland prejudice in a capital case in the First 
or the Second Circuit Courts of Appeal.  See Fromherz, supra note 56, at 403–10 (noting that many 
states have now abandoned capital punishment and most death penalty states are “weighing” states; 
therefore, some federal circuits only rarely encounter capital sentences or only review those from 
weighing states).   
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of the proceeding.”63  It is notable, however, that the Ninth Circuit has its 
own concerns related to application of appellate precedent on further review 
and remand. 64 
While there is confusion regarding the difference, and the ensuing sig-
nificance, between weighing and non-weighing states, the “unique serious-
ness”65 of a capital trial demands that clarity be given to circuit courts.  In 
accordance with relevant precedent of this Court, federal appellate courts 
considering state-imposed death sentences should take note of the underlying 
state’s death penalty framework,66 the role of the jury under that framework, 






 63 Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103, 1121 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 694 (1984)); see also Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1256 (9th Cir. 2002); Correll v. 
Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 951 (9th Cir. 2008); Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 930 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The 
aggravating evidence in Hovey’s case was strong, but it was not so overwhelming as to preclude 
the possibility of a life sentence.  Heinous crimes do not make mitigating evidence irrelevant.”). 
 64 Recent Case, Ninth Circuit Affirms That Courts Must Consider Aggravating Impact of Evidence 
When Evaluating Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Stankewiz v. Wong, 698 F.3d 1163 
(9th Cir. 2012), 126 HARV. L. REV. 2139, 2143 (May 2013) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit [has] resolved a 
longstanding inconsistency between its own cases and Supreme Court precedent . . . where counsel 
fails to present mitigating evidence. . . . But the majority failed to clarify how it weighed the de-
fendant’s mitigating and aggravating factors under this standard, providing lower courts with little 
practical guidance on when the balance of likely effects does or does not produce a reasonable 
probability that the sentence would have been different.”). 
 65 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 704 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 66 Weighing states vary in the number of aggravating factors they consider:  
Some states have a low number of aggravators, such as Montana, which has only 6; others 
have a high number of aggravators, like Delaware, which has 22.  Of the 32 states, 15 have 
10 or more aggravators.  The presence of a large number of aggravators is not necessarily 
an indicator of increased application of the death penalty.  For example, Kansas and Mon-
tana rank very low in executions per capita, whereas Oklahoma—which has only eight 
aggravators in its capital sentencing statute—ranks first in executions per capita, and sec-
ond in actual executions per death sentence.  Compared to Oklahoma, both Delaware and 
Pennsylvania have high numbers of aggravators; 22 and 18, respectively. Delaware, with 
22 aggravators, ranks second in executions per capita and first in actual executions per 
death sentence.  Pennsylvania, meanwhile, with 18 aggravators, has only executed three 
inmates since 1976.  
  Winchester, supra note 55, at 522–23 (N.B. Several of the states listed and described here no longer 
employ capital punishment). 
 67 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111–12 (1982) (“[T]he Court has attempted to provide stand-
ards for a constitutional death penalty that would serve both goals of measured, consistent applica-
tion and fairness to the accused. . . . ’[T]he fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth 
Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and 
the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of 
inflicting the penalty of death.’”) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)); 
Zant, 462 U.S. at 873. 
Jan. 2018] REMEDIAL READING 11 
1. A Number of Circuit Courts of Appeal Appear to Conflate the 
Analysis of Penalty-Phase Prejudice of Cases Arising from Non-
Weighing States with Analysis Appropriate to Weighing States  
The Eleventh Circuit includes two weighing states—Florida and Ala-
bama—and one non-weighing state—Georgia.68  Eleventh Circuit Strickland 
prejudice determinations, however, seem to inappropriately conflate weigh-
ing and non-weighing analysis without regard to the statutory scheme of each 
particular state.69  
The Fifth Circuit, which also includes non-weighing states, Texas and 
Louisiana, regularly misapplies the Strickland test in considering penalty-
phase prejudice.70  While the Texas capital punishment statute does not re-
quire a jury to conduct a balancing inquiry, federal appellate courts regularly 
do so on appellate review.71  Particular emphasis on the circumstances of the 
 
 68 See supra notes 53 and 54.  
 69 See, e.g., Holsey v. Warden, 694 F.3d 1230, 1268 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating, in reviewing a Georgia 
capital sentence penalty phase, that appellate courts must undertake a balancing inquiry to deter-
mine prejudice—”[C]ourts must ‘evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both 
that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding—and reweigh it against 
the evidence in aggravation.’”) (quoting Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 936 (11th Cir. 2005)); 
Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding deficiency of counsel prejudiced Georgia 
capital sentencing after weighing aggravating and mitigating factors); Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 
1165 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding no prejudice in Georgia penalty phase after weighing aggravating 
and mitigating factors); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1177 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding no 
prejudice in Alabama capital sentencing procedure after weighing mitigating and aggravating evi-
dence); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043. 1070–71 (11th Cir. 2002) (same); Wood v. Allen, 542 
F.3d 1281, 1313–14 (same); Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1556–59 (finding no prejudice 
in Florida sentencing procedure after weighing mitigating and aggravating evidence); Cummings 
v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1356–60, 1365–66 (same).  
 70 The conflation of weighing and non-weighing language is evidenced in Sonnier v. Quarterman, 
476 F.3d 349, 359–60 (5th Cir. 2007): “[The] mitigation evidence . . . would have shown some 
favorable aspects of Sonnier’s character, after re-weighing the aggravating evidence of record 
against it, we do not find that there is a reasonable probability that its introduction would have 
caused the jury to decline to impose the death penalty in this case.”  See also Ransom v. Johnson, 
126 F.3d 716, 723-24 (5th Cir. 1997); Williams v. Cain, 125 F.3d 269, 277 (5th Cir. 1997); Hankins 
v. Quarterman, 288 Fed. Appx. 952 (5th Cir. 2008); Garza v. Stephens, 738 F.3d 669, 680–81 (5th 
Cir. 2013); Wood v. Quarterman, 491 F.3d 196, 202–03 (5th Cir. 2007); Motley v. Collins, 18 F.3d 
1223, 1227–28 (5th Cir. 1994) ; Hood v. Dretke, 93 Fed. Appx. 665, 671 (5th Cir. 2004); Pondexter 
v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 511, 524 (5th Cir. 2008); Moore v. Maggio, 740 F.2d 308, 319 (5th Cir. 
1984). 
 71 See supra note 70 for list of cases.  The Fifth Circuit further explained that on review the United 
States Supreme Court must “reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available 
mitigating evidence.” Sonnier, 476 F.3d at 359-60 (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 
(2003)); see also Clark v. Thaler, 673 F.3d 410, 422 (5th Cir. 2012) (requiring “a reasonable prob-
ability that, absent [counsel’s] errors, the sentence . . . would have concluded that the balance of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death” (quoting Strickland v. Washing-
ton, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984))) (emphasis added). 
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crime as compared to available mitigation evidence is indicative of this im-
proper analysis.72  
Similarly, although the Fourth Circuit includes states with both weighing 
and non-weighing statutory schemes, its Court of Appeals analyzes penalty-
phase prejudice without consideration of the differing capital sentencing stat-
utes.73  This is also the case in decisions of the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.74  
2. The Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal Have Expressed 
Concern About the Proper Method of Analyzing Penalty-Phase 
Prejudice in Cases from States with Differing Capital Sentencing 
Statutes 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressed concern about the 
lack of clarity regarding review of capital sentencing in weighing and non-
weighing states. The Eighth Circuit is comprised of four states with capital 
punishment statutes; it includes two non-weighing states—Missouri and 
South Dakota—and two weighing states—Arkansas and Nebraska.75 
Prior to Brown v. Sanders,76 discussed infra Part III, the Eighth Circuit, 
in Rousan v. Roper, properly reviewed state capital sentencing in light of the 
weighing/non-weighing distinction.77  Though the particular result in Rousan 
would be identical under the weighing or non-weighing jurisprudence,78 it is 
impossible to predict the effect of an abandonment of this state-specific anal-
ysis.  
 
 72 See e.g., Ladd v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 349, 360 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that certain mitigating evi-
dence is “double edged” and overwhelming evidence of future dangerousness made it “virtually 
impossible to establish [sentencing] prejudice.”).  
 73 See, e.g., Lovitt v. True, 403 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2005) (applying weighing analysis to a Virginia 
case, which is a non-weighing state); Briley v. Bass, 750 F.2d 1238, 1247–48 (4th Cir. 1984); 
Emmett v. Kelly, 474 F.3d 154, 170–72 (4th Cir. 2007); Hunt v. Lee, 291 F.3d 284, 292 (4th Cir. 
2002); Jackson v. Kelly, 650 F.3d 477, 493, 495 (4th Cir. 2011); Gray v. Branker, 529 F.3d 220, 
235 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Note, Criminal Procedure—Confrontation Clause—Fourth Circuit 
Finds No Right to Confrontation During Sentence Selection Phase of Capital Trial, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 1027, 1033–34 (2015) (noting that a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury determination of all facts necessary to render him eligible for the death penalty).  
 74 See, e.g., Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 283 (3d Cir. 2001) (requiring reviewing courts to evaluate 
the totality of the available mitigation evidence and reweigh it against the evidence in aggravation); 
see also Saranchak v. Sec’y, Pa. Dept. of Corr., 802 F.3d 579, 600 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 75 See supra notes 53 and 54. 
 76 546 U.S. 212, 219 (2006) (“This weighing/non-weighing scheme is accurate as far as it goes, but 
it now seems to us needlessly complex and incapable of providing for the full range of possible 
variations.”). 
 77 Rousan v. Roper, 436 F.3d 951, 963 (8th Cir. 2006) (“We have long analyzed the effect of an 
invalid aggravating circumstance on the constitutionality of a death sentence by first determining 
whether the defendant was sentenced in a ‘weighing’ or ‘non-weighing’ state.”). 
 78 Id. at 964 n.5 (“We would reach the same result under the previous weighing/non-weighing juris-
prudence.”). 
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There is also a lack of clarity about how Strickland should be applied in 
light of different capital sentencing statutes of the states in the Tenth Cir-
cuit.79  This may in part be due to the fact that the Tenth Circuit includes a 
number of states with “hybrid” death penalty sentencing statute.80  That fed-
eral appellate court is at least explicit about describing the lack of guidance 
for review from a hybrid state,81 which indicates an awareness of and desire 
to comply with the appropriate application of the facts to the test. 
3. Some Federal Appellate Courts, Especially the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, Appear to Take Special Care to Analyze Penalty-Phase 
Prejudice According to Whether a Sentence Has Rendered in a     
“Weighing” Or “Non-Weighing” State 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals properly applies Strickland and tai-
lors its analysis to whether it is dealing with a weighing state or a non-weigh-
ing state.82  The Ninth Circuit is comprised of weighing and non-weighing 
states.83  In particular, in the Ninth Circuit the court demonstrates deference 
to specific and individual state law, noting that “in establishing prejudice 
under Strickland, it is not necessary for the habeas petitioner to demonstrate 
that the newly presented mitigation evidence would necessarily overcome 
 
 79 Some states in the Tenth Circuit, such as Oklahoma, have been defined as weighing by further 
analysis on the state death penalty statute.  See Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d. 810, 816 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(“Accordingly, the jury must find the existence of at least one aggravating factor beyond reasonable 
doubt and then must conclude the circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating evidence 
presented by the defendant before it may recommend a death sentence.” (citing Castro v. Okla-
homa, 71 F.3d at 1505-06 n.3; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.11-.12 (West 1995))).  The Colorado 
statute requires the jury to weigh mitigation evidence against statutory aggravators (like a weighing 
state) but allows the jury to make a final determination using all available evidence during the final 
stage of deliberation.  See People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 791 (Colo. 1990).  
 80 See Davis v. Exec. Dir. of Dep’t. of Corr., 100 F.3d 750, 768 (10th Cir. 1996) (describing Colo-
rado’s sentencing system as a “hybrid” system).  
 81 Id. (noting that the Supreme Court “has not specifically indicated whether the Clemons re-weigh-
ing/harmless-error analysis or the Zant analysis applies to states having ‘hybrid’ systems like Col-
orado’s” (citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 
(1983))).  
 82 See e.g., Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying correctly the Strickland 
test to an ineffective-counsel claim in an Arizona capital sentencing, and finding prejudice after 
observing “that, in capital cases, the Arizona Supreme Court conducts an independent review of 
the aggravating and mitigating factors, re-weighing them afresh” and that “[a]t the time of [De-
fendant’s] appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court was also required to conduct an independent pro-
portionality review”); Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying Montana’s 
mitigation and aggravation standards to the Strickland analysis); Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 
1103, 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (evaluating an attorney’s performance under Strickland in light 
of Arizona sentencing law); see also Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2013); 
Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 629-36 (9th Cir. 2010); Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 
1000–02 (9th Cir. 2004); Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1985–87 (9th Cir. 2003); Smith v. 
Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 83 See supra notes 53 and 54. 
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the aggravating circumstances.”84   Likewise, the Sixth and Seventh Circuit 
Courts of Appeal Circuit appear to take care to analyze penalty-phase preju-
dice in light of the relevant state sentencing statute. 85  
__________ 
While some federal appellate courts properly consider penalty-phase 
prejudice, the majority of federal circuits require direction about how to ap-
ply Strickland’s test without ignoring the underlying capital sentencing 
scheme.  
II. THE ANALYSIS OF THE ANALYSIS 
Federal courts know well and liberally refer to and quote from the ubiq-
uitous Strickland two-part test.86  How, then, could it be possible that federal 
courts could crosswise with appropriate constitutional analysis by avoiding 
direct interaction with state sentencing statutes?  A number of scholars have 
noted the difficult position federal appellate courts (and indeed, state appel-
late courts) find themselves in when analyzing penalty-phase prejudice in 
capital cases.87  Cases of this sort include voluminous records with issues of 
varying strength and complexity.88  And the breadth of what may be pre-
sented in capital sentencing hearings makes it difficult to imagine what im-
pact (if any) new or invalidated evidence may have played in the jury’s con-
siderations.89  Many courts, however, would find it burdensome to remand 
every capital sentencing case for new sentencing on the presentation of new 
mitigation evidence.90  As a practical matter, many federal courts, unless 
 
 84 Lambright v. Schriro, 485 F.3d 512, 530 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 85 See e.g., Woolley v. Rednour, 702 F.3d 411, 420–29 (7th Cir. 2012) (conducting Strickland analy-
sis in light of Illinois sentencing law); Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 618 (6th Cir. 2003) (con-
ducting Strickland analysis in light of Ohio sentencing law).  
 86 John G. Douglas, Confronting Death: Six Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM 
L. REV. 1967, 1972 (2005) (arguing that “the whole of the Sixth Amendment applies to the whole 
of the capital case, whether the issue is guilt, death eligibility, or the final selection of who lives 
and who dies”). 
 87 See, e.g., Widder, supra note 29, at 1372–73. 
 88 Paul Marcus, The United States Supreme Court (Mostly) Gives Up its Review Role with Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Cases, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1745, 1752–59 (2016); See Michael Mello, “In 
the Years When Murder Wore the Mask of Law’’; Diary of Captial Appeals Lawyer, 24 Vt. L. Rev. 
583, 598 (2000)( Discussing the strenuous hours of labor often involved in litigating death penalty 
cases) 
 89 See Ingrid A. Holewinkski, “Inherently Arbitrary and Capricious”: An Empirical Analysis of Var-
iations Among State Death Penalty Statutes, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 241–42 (2002) 
(describing the many kinds of mitigating evidence defendants may present). 
 90 See Ryan C. Thomas, Not-So-Harmless Error: A Higher Standard for Mitigation Errors on Capital 
Habeas Review, 89 WASH. L. REV. 515, 522–26 (2014) (explaining that the jury must be able to 
hear and give meaningful effect to the mitigation evidence and give individual consideration to the 
facts of the case and characteristics of the defendant). 
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very carefully avoiding weighing language and analysis in scrupulous defer-
ence to death penalty statutes of the state in which a defendant was sen-
tenced, “reweigh” evidence presented to the jury on post-conviction re-
view.91 
Let us return to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for examples and 
illustrations.  Two recent Florida state cases with capital sentences feature 
explicit balancing language, as well they should: Florida is a weighing 
state.92  Hardwick v. Florida Department of Corrections explained, “The 
State correctly observes that the District Court was required to place both the 
aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances in the scales to 
appropriately weigh them.”93  Similarly, Barwick v. Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections held “the Florida Supreme Court was not unreason-
able” when it determined that aggravating circumstances would have still 
greatly outweighed any mitigating circumstances . . . .”94  Consider, on the 
other hand, Hosley v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison, a Georgia case.95  
In examining alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals explained that it must “evaluate the totality of the available 
mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in 
the habeas proceeding—and reweigh it against the evidence in aggrava-
tion.”96  The court, which ultimately affirmed, discussed extensively whether 
the aggravating circumstances “outweigh” the mitigating, using it six times, 
in addition to “balance” twice, and “weigh” once.97  Likewise, Lance v. War-
den, Georgia Diagnostic Prison affirmed a conviction and death sentence, 
holding the prisoner suffered no prejudice in lower courts’ analyses of his 
Sixth Amendment claim. 98  The court here clearly used “weighing” analysis, 
citing cases deriving from Florida as legal precedence.99  All of the cases 
 
 91 See James C. Scoville, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in Capital Sentencing, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
740, 742 (1987); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (“[I]n capital cases the funda-
mental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration [by the 
reviewing court] of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the 
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of 
death.” (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976))). 
 92 See supra note 53. 
 93 Hardwick v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 803 F.3d 541, 559 (2015). 
 94 Barwick v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 764 F.3d 1239, 1251 (2015). 
 95 Hosley v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 694 F.3d 1230, 1268 (2012). 
 96 Id. (quoting Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 936 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
 97 Id. at 1268–73; id. at 1289–94 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
 98 Lance v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison, No. 16-15008, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16778, at 
*19, *24–25 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2017).  
 99 Id. at *21(“Indeed, ‘[o]ur analysis of the prejudice prong . . . must also take into account the aggra-
vating circumstances associated with [Lance]’s case . . . .’  “At the end of the day, we are required 
to ‘reweigh the evidence in aggravating against the totality of available mitigating evidence.’” (first 
quoting Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383, 1390 (11th Cir. 1998); then quoting Boyd v. Allen, 592 
F.3d 1274, 1301 (11th Cir. 2010)) (alterations in original). 
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cited, including Wiggins, involved death sentences originating from weigh-
ing states or former weighing states.100  
But does appellate courts’ use of the words “weigh,” “reweigh,” or “out-
weigh” alone signify that a federal court has employed an inappropriate 
Strickland analysis in a case from a non-weighing state?  Not necessarily, 
though that is an area of concern.  Some federal appellate opinions, long and 
exhaustive though they may be, do not explicitly reference the sentencing 
jury’s instructions, which is not in itself error, but may indicate whether a 
court has borne the underlying statute and instructions in mind when consid-
ering ineffectiveness or additional mitigation.   
Improper or overreaching analysis may likewise occur whether or not a 
court employs the actual words “weigh” or “reweigh.”  Returning to our ex-
ample from the Introduction, supra, Mr. Bishop’s federal habeas counsel al-
leged that trial counsel had failed in a number of ways, prejudicing Mr. 
Bishop in the sentencing phase of trial.101  Because mitigating testimony and 
physical evidence is particularly important in a state (such as Georgia) where 
anything could have persuaded a juror to vote for life,102 questions of attor-
ney error and prejudice are extremely important. 
Jury instructions to Mr. Bishop’s sentencing jury—the standard instruc-
tions in Georgia—explained: “You may fix the penalty at life imprisonment 
if you see fit to do so for any reason satisfactory to you or without any rea-
son.”103  Under Georgia law, there is a reasonable probability that, had coun-
sel presented the officers’ testimony, the jury would have been given the 
“any reason satisfactory” needed to vote for a sentence of life.  In Mr. 
Bishop’s case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals never addressed the 
deficient performance prong and disposed of the issue after its prejudice 
analysis.104  Specifically, it held the state habeas court’s decision was not 
unreasonable because extensive mitigation evidence available (but not pre-
 
 100 See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (finding penalty-phase prejudice due to ineffective 
counsel after “reweigh[ing] the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating 
evidence” in reviewing a Maryland capital sentencing, a former weighing state under MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303 (LexisNexis 2002) (repealed 2013)) 
 101 Bishop v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification State Prison, 726 F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 
2013). 
 102 Heidler v. State, 537 S.E.2d 44, 56 (2000) (“The trial court properly instructed the jury to consider 
mitigating circumstances, and that it could impose a life sentence for any reason or no reason at 
all.”); Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1459 (1985) (“In the current Georgia capital punishment 
regime, the sentencing jury has complete discretion to choose between life imprisonment or death 
after the finding of one statutory aggravating circumstance.”). 
 103 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31(c) (West 2009) (“[Without a unanimous jury decision], the judge 
shall dismiss the jury and shall impose a sentence of either life imprisonment or imprisonment for 
life without parole.”). 
 104 Bishop, 726 F.3d at 1255. 
Jan. 2018] REMEDIAL READING 17 
sented) would not have “undercut” Mr. Bishop’s involvement in the mur-
ders105 or “undermined in any way the statutory aggravator found by the 
jury.”106  
The Eleventh Circuit’s legal analysis of Mr. Bishop’s Strickland issue 
focused solely on the potential effect presentation of the testimony could 
have had on the State’s case for guilt or in aggravation.  Whether the miti-
gating evidence “undercut” or “undermined” the State’s theory of the case is 
wholly irrelevant when reviewing the state court’s prejudice determina-
tion.107  The Eleventh Circuit’s “weighing” analysis was inappropriate in that 
case and in others—inapposite to Georgia’s death penalty framework and to 
the instructions received by his sentencing jury.  And whether the volumi-
nous and compelling mitigating evidence omitted from Mr. Bishop’s trial 
“undercut” or “undermined” the State’s aggravating factors should have had 
no bearing on whether the state court was reasonable in concluding that 
“Bishop has failed to show how he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s 
decisions.”108 
Unfortunately, it appears that a number of courts overlook a primary 
point: the finding of an aggravating circumstance at the sentencing phase is 
presumed after a guilty verdict.109  The question, therefore, is whether coun-
sel’s error requires a new review of sentencing evidence by a factfinder ap-




 105 Id, at 1255–56. 
 106 Id. at 1256. 
 107 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000) (“Mitigating evidence . . . may alter the jury’s 
selection of penalty, even if it does not undermine the prosecution’s death-eligibility case.”). 
 108 Bishop v. Upton, No. 5:08–CV–91 (HL), 2010 WL 1781008, at *9 (M.D.Ga. May 4, 2010) (citation 
omitted).  Under Georgia’s sentencing legislation, “the jury receives no instructions to give special 
weight to any aggravating circumstance, to consider multiple aggravating circumstances any more 
significant than a single such circumstance, or to balance the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances pursuant to any special standard.”  Simpkins v. State, 486 S.E.2d 833, 836 (Ga. 1997) 
(quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 873–74 (1983)).  Further, as the United States Supreme 
Court explained in Zant, “[I]n Georgia, the finding of an aggravating circumstance does not play 
any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion, apart from its function of 
narrowing the class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty.”  Zant, 
462 U.S. at 874. 
 109 See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 510. 
 110 See Ingrid A. Holewinski, Inherently Arbitrary and Capricious: An Empirical Analysis of Varia-
tions Among State Death Penalty Statutes, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 242 (2002) (“Jurors 
who are assisted with the evaluation of mitigating factors are less likely to impose death sen-
tences. . . . Proper communication and explanation are essential to ensure that defendants are not 
sentenced to death merely due to confusion.”). 
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III. BUILDING A SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF INCONSISTENT ANALYSIS 
A. The United States Supreme Court Should Clarify the Appropriate 
Analysis of Penalty-Phase Prejudice in Capital Cases for Non-
Weighing States 
Despite the split among federal circuits and despite what appears—at 
least to some advocates and scholars—to be a potential misapplication of 
Strickland, the United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the error 
of conducting a weighing analysis of penalty-phase prejudice in a capital 
case from a non-weighing state.  While in Brown v. Sanders111 the United 
States Supreme Court considered the impact of weighing invalidated aggra-
vating factors presented in capital sentencing, a different issue is described 
here.  
The Court has considered weighing and non-weighing structures,112 but 
not as to this particular question of the interplay between statutory structure 
and penalty phase prejudice.113   While Brown described the weighing versus 
non-weighing distinction as still “accurate” and the controlling law of to-
day’s death penalty jurisprudence, it described the scheme as “needlessly 
complex” while noting it was developed “relatively early in the development 
of [its] death-penalty prejudice.”114  Brown also noted the difference between 
a weighing and non-weighing state is not one of semantics—reiterating that 
the Court has “held that in all capital cases the sentencer must be allowed to 
weigh the facts and circumstances that arguably justify a death sentence 
against the defendant’s mitigating evidence.”115  Brown, however, addressed 
the legal role of sentencing aggravators under the weighing versus non-
weighing scheme116; yet, the inverse issue—the role of mitigators—remains 
uncharted territory.117 
 
 111 546 U.S. 212, 214 (2006). 
 112 See Widder, supra note 29 at 1343-44 (“In jurisdictions where the sentencer is instructed to weigh 
the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine the appropriate penalty, the Court has con-
cluded that aggravating factors guide the sentencer’s discretion and, consequently, reliance on an 
invalid aggravating factor improperly tilts the sentencing balance in favor of death.  In weighing 
jurisdictions, therefore, the Court has prohibited automatic affirmance of death sentences that rest 
in part on invalid aggravating factors.  On the other hand, in jurisdictions whose statutory schemes 
do not require the sentencer to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors, the Court has deter-
mined that the invalidation of one or more aggravating factors is meaningless, as long as at least 
one valid aggravating factor remains to support the defendant’s death penalty.”). 
 113 Brown, 546 U.S. at 220. 
 114 Id. at 217, 219. 
 115 Id. at 216–17 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982)). 
 116 Id. 
 117 While the Supreme Court has also used weighing language when addressing prejudice claims from 
non-weighing states, it has not yet addressed mitigators.  See Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 16 
(2009) (addressing prejudice claims from California); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 776 (1987) 
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Since Strickland, the United States Supreme Court has considered dis-
tinctive issues of weighing versus non-weighing states and effective counsel 
in single cases—implicitly recognizing the relationship between the evi-
dence presented to the jury and the role of counsel in the presentation of that 
evidence.118  All information given to the jury becomes critical for a capital 
defendant in a non-weighing state because the jury can return a life verdict 
based on any reason or no articulated reason.119  Strickland itself clearly 
notes, “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the 
sentencer—including an appellate court, to the extent it independently re-
weighs the evidence—would have concluded that the balance of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”120  That case, of course, 
originated from Florida, a weighing state.121  Likewise, a number of other 
groundbreaking U.S. Supreme Court precedents related to ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in capital cases have emerged from weighing states.122  Un-
less a federal appellate court pays very close attention to the capital sentenc-
ing scheme underlying a case heard and decided by the Supreme Court, it 
would be entirely possible to quote a case from the highest court in the land 
and miss its proper application.  And while the Court has come close to 
reaching this issue, it has not squarely addressed it.123  
It seems incredible that the Supreme Court has allowed errors such as 
these to persist, and yet capital litigation is so complicated124 (as is the pro-
cess of granting or not granting certiorari), there are a number of variables 
that could be responsible for this.125  The Court’s decision not to accept a 
 
(addressing prejudice claims from Georgia); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367 (2000) (ad-
dressing prejudice claims from Virginia).  Like the other constitutional issues the Court has ana-
lyzed when treating weighing versus non-weighing states differently, this case presents the first 
opportunity to take the non-weighing state sentencing practices into account when articulating the 
proper prejudice standard.  
 118 See, e.g., Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139, 145–49, 154 (2010). 
 119 The minority of states, however, do not require such specific standards.  Georgia is in that minority.  
See Ford v. State, 360 S.E.2d 258, 260 (Ga 1987). 
 120 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (emphasis supplied). 
 121 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (2013), invalidated by Perry v. State, 210 So.3d 630 (Fla. 2016).  
 122 See e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (per curiam) (emerging from Florida); Rompilla 
v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (emerging from Pennsylvania); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 
534 (2003) (emerging from Maryland); Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S.Ct. 1081 (2014) (emerging from 
Alabama). 
 123 See e.g., Spisak, 558 U.S. at 145-49, 154. 
 124 Kyle Graham, Tactical Ineffective Assistance in Capital Trials, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1645, 1656–61 
(2008) (describing a modern trend toward heightened scrutiny of mitigation investigations in cap-
ital sentencing). 
 125 See John G. Douglas, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 
COLUM L. REV. 1967, 1970, 1970 n.20 (2005) (discussing the failure of the Court to “put the Sixth 
Amendment pieces together” and the general lack of scholarly commentary on the application of 
the Sixth Amendment at capital sentencing); see also generally Thomas Aumann, Death by Peers: 
The Extension of the Sixth Amendment to Capital Sentencing in Ring v. Arizona, 34 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 845 (2003) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court correctly extended the Sixth Amendment to 
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case for review has no legal bearing on the strength or weakness of the issues 
presented.126  Further, concern about appropriate federal appellate review is 
more subtle than, say, an issue present since trial, such as racial bias, prose-
cutorial misconduct, or judge-issued sentences; there could be a number of 
reasons why counsel would choose to proceed on another claim.127 
This Article is not arguing mere semantics; Mr. Bishop’s case illustrates 
how the weighing state analysis fails to adequately consider the role of a 
Georgia jury.128  The simple use of the word “weigh” will not indicate 
whether a federal appellate court applied the correct analysis, nor will its 
absence; rather, as Strickland explains, the correct analysis requires an eval-
uation of the explicit considerations of the sentencing statute, the sentencing 
jurors’ process, and the likelihood that omitted evidence may have impacted 
the outcome of the (sentencing) proceedings.129  The Court has long recog-
nized the high stakes involved in death penalty cases; thus, the proper appli-
cation of the correct legal rule and subsequent analysis is absolutely criti-
cal.130  Academically, this is important,131 and the outcome of the failure, of 
course, is an unjust execution.  
Although, as discussed infra, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has ex-
perienced its own struggles related to California’s non-weighing capital sen-
tencing statute,132 the sort of analysis undertaken in that federal court could 
well be a guide to follow.  The likelihood of this Court accepting a model set 
by the Ninth Circuit, however, seems low.  
 
the capital sentencing phase of trial.). 
 126 Stephen R. McAllister, Practice Before the Supreme Court of the United States, 64-APR J. KAN. 
B.A. 25, 30 (1995). 
 127 Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should Control the Decision to Call a Witness: Respecting a Criminal 
Defendant’s Tactical Choices, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 763, 765 (2000) (discussing how criminal de-
fense attorneys are given broad discretion in their strategic trial decisions).  
 128 See Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 216–18 (2006) (explaining how the weighing state analysis 
restricts jurors from considering facts and circumstances relevant to an invalid eligibility factor in 
another capacity). 
 129 Katie Morgan & Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Impact of Information Overload on the Cap-
ital Jury’s Ability to Assess Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1089, 1096–97 (2009). 
 130 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (recognizing that the unique stakes 
involved in death penalty decisions demand “a corresponding difference in the need for reliability 
in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case”). 
 131 See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, The Facts About Ring v. Arizona and the Jury’s Role in Capital 
Sentencing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 550 (2011) (“While the states can be roughly categorized 
into weighing states – which limit the factors that may be considered in aggravation – and non-
weighing states – which do not place limits on the factors considered in aggravation – there is a 
fair amount of variation in how the states ask triers of fact to engage in this balancing.”). 
 132 See Karen Lamprey, Brown v. Sanders: Invalid Factors and Appellate Review in Capital Sentenc-
ing, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 743, 745-46 (2006) (“If a jury used an invalid sentencing factor to deter-
mine eligibility for a death sentence, the United States Supreme Court requires either a re-weigh-
ing of all the factors or a harmless-error review if no mitigating factors are present.”). 
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B. Unless and Until the Supreme Court Takes Up This Issue, Advocates 
Must Learn About and Continue to Raise This Issue Where Appropriate 
Should the United States Supreme Court fail to accept a case on certiorari 
and resolve the issue, the next best step is training—both for capital defend-
ers and federal judges.  Practitioners from non-weighing states need to be 
proactive in advocacy before circuits of appeal, explicit about the correct 
review standards, and prepared to raise the issue in briefing and oral argu-
ment.133  
Where a defendant challenges his death sentence, the reviewing court 
should first determine whether the defendant’s conviction was imposed in a 
weighing or non-weighing state.134  In Strickland and other cases, the United 
States Supreme Court has explicitly demonstrated the analysis appropriate 
to a weighing state.  In cases originating in a non-weighing state, however, 
the general Strickland standard governs, but should be applied consistent 
with the state death penalty statute at issue. This more adequately accounts 
for the role of mitigation and jury deliberations in non-weighing states be-
cause a jury may vote for life for any reason regardless of the weight of evi-
dence.135  
The analysis of the Eleventh Circuit in Mr. Bishop’s case and others ex-
poses this confusion.  Its penalty phase analysis did not mention Georgia 
law, and its opinion tracks that in cases arising from Florida and Alabama 
that have entirely different capital sentencing statutes.  The Eleventh Circuit 
ultimately ignored Georgia’s statutory scheme. Significantly, the problem is 
not confined to the Eleventh Circuit, as examples of confusion and conflation 
of this issue can be seen in other circuits as well.136  Without guidance from 
 
 133 It is worth noting here that fewer death sentences are being handed down nationwide.  States are 
abolishing death penalty statutes and states that still employ the death penalty are seeing fewer and 
fewer death sentences that will need to be challenged through the post-conviction process. Georgia, 
for example, has had no death sentences since 2014.  See Bill Rankin, Death Sentences Now a 
Rarity in Georgia, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.myajc.com/news/local/death-
sentences-now-rarity-georgia/WdQLa49GwzpRLG9XrBiMIM/.  Still, in the hundreds of remain-
ing death penalty cases arising from non-weighing states, this may be an issue for federal post-
conviction review. 
 134 Srikanth Srinivasan, Capital Sentencing Doctrine and the Weighing-Nonweighing Distinction, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1347, 1368 (1995) (maintaining that the distinction between applying weighing ver-
sus non-weighing provisions is of critical importance to the result in a case). 
 135 Implicitly, the United States Supreme Court recognized the cumulative impact different new or 
different mitigating evidence could make on a jury’s decision in a non-weighing state. See Williams 
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398-99 (2000); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 199-202 (2011) 
(using a weight of the evidence lens for non-weighing state of California).  
 136 This applies to any circuit that includes a non-weighing state. See Von Dohlen v. State, 602 S.E.2d 
738, 746 (2004) (quoting State v. McClure, 342 S.C. 403, 409 (2000) (“We note the evaluation of 
the consequences of an error in the sentencing phase of a capital case is more difficult because of 
the discretion that is given to the sentencing jury. A capital jury can recommend a life sentence for 
any reason or no reason at all.”). See also Emmett v. Kelly, 474 F.3d 154, 170–71 (4th Cir. 2007); 
Ransom v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 716, 725–26 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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the Court, federal appellate courts will continue to conflate the analysis of 
penalty phrase prejudice in cases from weighing and non-weighing states. 
Though Strickland itself has its limitations,137 it nevertheless articulates 
the foundational standard for Sixth Amendment review. The fact that not all 
circuits follow its principle that the state capital sentencing scheme (or “gov-
erning legal standard”) defines the parameters of assessment of prejudice is 
an issue of concern, not merely from an academic perspective, but a practical 
one.  The best and clearest course would be for the United States Supreme 
Court to accept a case with a procedural posture similar to Mr. Bishop’s and 
announce to federal courts that proper penalty-phase prejudice in non-weigh-
ing states is the general Strickland standard tailored to the underlying capital 
sentencing statute.  Without guidance, lower federal courts will continue to 
conflate the analysis of penalty-phase prejudice in cases from weighing and 
non-weighing states.  This is not only academically and philosophically im-
portant, but failure to do so allows improper review of the most significant 
case a court can review: a sentence of death. 
 
 
 137 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 716–17 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In my view, a person on death row, 
whose counsel’s performance fell below constitutionally acceptable levels, should not be com-
pelled to demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability’ that he would have been given a life sentence if 
his lawyer had been competent . . . if the defendant can establish a significant chance that the out-
come would have been different, he surely should be entitled to a redetermination of his fate.”). 
